Two of the most important events in South Korea of the 1950s were clearly the Korean War and the land reform. The South Korean land reform is commonly evaluated as having established the foundation for the capitalist development of South Korea through its dismantling of the landlord system and the creation of a system based on independent farmers. To date, a number of economics-based case studies of the land reform have been carried out. Such studies, however, have rested on a methodological presumption of individualism that risks overlooking the more complex network of social relationships that typified the daily lives of farmers, and which influenced the process of land reform. This article aims to analyze the South Korean land reform by focusing on a region called Chilliansok, part of Jangheung-gun's Yongsan-myeon in Jeollanam-do, and a place where the system of traditional authority continued to exert a tangible influence for years after national liberation. It demonstrates that in the case of Chilliansok, those who had been traditionally marginalized in the local society took advantage of the opportunities offered by the land reform to increase their land holdings and status. However, the institutional limitations of that land reform-namely the small size of distributed land plots-meant that true economic independence still eluded them. Ultimately, it was the "leading families" of the region who were able to mobilize their more established and powerful kinship and power networks in transactions of land outside of the land reform to strengthen their position relative to the ordinary and more marginalized families. Without such traditional networks, the "ordinary families" had a more difficult time in reaping the benefits of the land reform. Unable to sustain their livelihoods, the last resort for many marginalized rural households was to move out of the countryside.
Introduction
In search of the historical foundation to the state-led industrialization of the 1960s and 1970s, interest in the 1950s has been on the rise in South Korean society. Two of the most important events in South Korea of the 1950s are, of course, the Korean War and land reform. The South Korean land reform is evaluated as an event that set the foundation for the capitalist development in South Korea by dismantling the landlord system and replacing it with a system based on independent farmers. 1 Furthermore, through the dismantling of the landlord class, the land reform is said have increased the state's autonomy, improved the state-farmer relationship, and created mass support for the Syngman Rhee regime. The South Korean land reform, in short, is said to have established the basis for the developmental state. Yet save for the dismantlement of the landlord class, these notions regarding the land reform and its consequences are abstract and groundless.
While I agree with many of the more positive evaluations of the South Korean land reform, I have several questions as well. First, while it is unquestionable that the land reform destroyed the landlord class in South Korea, did it necessarily contribute to the development of capitalism? The land reform merely transformed poor tenant farmers into still poor independent farmers with small landholdings. In other words, the land reform did not fundamentally improve the dire conditions of small-scale farming all across South Korea. Were not the massive rural exoduses of the 1960s and 1970s the logical next step for these small-scale farmers? The second question has to do with the assertion that the state was able to directly control the farmers by dismantling the landlord class. I am suspicious of the notion that the absence of a landlord class necessarily strengthened the state's power over the rural areas, and I am also skeptical that following the reform the peasantry remained 1. For a systematic overview of issues surrounding the land reform, see Jang Sanghwan, "Nongji gaehyeok eul dulleossan jaengjeom eun mueot inga," in Jaengjeom Hanguk geunhyeondaesa, vol. 3, edited by Hanguk geundaesa yeonguso (Seoul: Hanguk geundaesa yeonguso, 1993), 8-23; Jang Siwon, "Nongji gaehyeok-Jijuje haeche wa jajaknong cheje ui seongnip," in Haebang jeonhusa ui jaeinsik, vol. 2, edited by Bak Jihyang et al. (Seoul: Chaeksesang, 2006) , 345-389. While these articles differ in their specific points of view, they do agree that the South Korean land reform made a critical contribution to the development of capitalism by dismantling the landlord system and instituting a system of independent farmers. For an overview of more recent research trends and questions, see the introductory section of Jo Seokgon, "Nongji gaehyeok dangsi subunbae nongga ui toji soyu gujo byeonhwa e gwanhan yeongu: Wonju-si Hojeo-myeon ui sarye," Gyeongje sahak 46 (2009): 127-161. fragmented by family units. Furthermore, I have serious doubts regarding the assertion that the land reform generated widespread support, on the part of farmers, for the Syngman Rhee regime. 2 With such questions in mind, this article aims to expose a new facet of the process and impact of the South Korean land reform. To date a number of case studies of the land reform using methods of economics have been carried out. Such research, however, presupposes a methodological individualism that risks overlooking the different layers of social relationships in the daily lives of farmers, which may have influenced the process of land reform. As a result, such studies looked at farmers economically as isolated individuals rather than as strands in a complex web of social relationships. In other words, they were simply taken as members of a certain class or social stratum according to the sizes of their landholdings. Conscious of such shortcomings, this article aims to focus on the often-overlooked social aspect of land reform. As one scholar aptly noted, the source of power and authority in rural communities rests in the tripartite relationship between the land, administrative power, and kinship networks.
3 These may be understood respectively as the economic, political, and social origins of power and authority. Accepting this point, I want to expand the concept of social origin of power and authority in rural communities to the "system of traditional authority." Rooted in traditional status and blood ties, the system of traditional authority continued to operate in rural communities long after the abolition of the status system in Korea and played a role in the conflicts that waged in the rural communities during the Korean War. 4 While 2. Kim Ilyeong, 2006, "Nongji gaehyeok eul dulleossan sinhwa ui haeche," in Haebang jeonhusa ui jaeinsik, vol. 2, edited by Bak Jihyang et al. (Seoul: Chaeksesang, 2006) , 295-344. I have carried out extensive fieldwork in rural communities over the past ten years, and in that time I have never heard a farmer give a positive evaluation of Syngman Rhee. Contrary to the mythicization of Park Chung Hee's "New Village Movement," memories of the land reform were often blurry. Furthermore, farmers' memories of Syngman Rhee were clearly negative. The issue of memory is an entirely different issue that cannot be fully discussed here. I do, however, want to argue that the myth surrounding the land reform must be dismantled.
3. Kim Seongbo, "1900-50-yeondae Jincheon-gun Iwon-myeon toji soyu wa sahoe byeonhwa," in Gwangmu yangan gwa jincheon ui sahoe gyeongje byeondong, edited by Sin Yeongu (Seoul: Hyean, 2007), 158.
4. The "system of traditional authority" here refers to the hierarchy of traditional prestige that has been built over the generations based on status and kinship networks and continues to function as a symbolic power into the modern era. Tradition, of course, is more of a modern reconstruction of the past than an actual existence. Even so, however, traditional status and prestige continue to be reaffirmed into the present day in the name of tradition and sometimes used as symbolic political capital. For this, see Yi Yonggi [Lee Yong-ki] , "Ilje sigi jiyeok sahoe eseo ui jeontongjeok gwanwi jilseo ui jisok gwa byeonyong-Jeonnam Jangheung-gun hyanggyo gyoim bunseok eul jungsim euro," Yeoksa munje yeongu 21 (2009): 251-293. the upheaval of the Korean War dealt a serious blow to the hierarchical status system, its influence, based on blood ties, continued to be felt in rural communities after the Korean War and thereby influenced the process of land reform. This article aims to analyze the South Korean land reform by focusing on a region called Chilliansok, a part of Jangheung-gun's Yongsan-myeon in Jeollanam-do, a place where the system of traditional authority continued to exert a tangible influence for years after liberation and the Korean War. The temporal scope of this study will extend from the moment of liberation to the end of the 1960s. The rationale behind the scope, of course, has to do with the fact that South Korean land reform was a long process that stretched from the prior selling of land in the immediate liberation period, distribution of land in 1950, and repayments and title transfers that continued into the end of 1960s. I aim to analyze the land reform by focusing on how the system of traditional authority operated and changed over time through the process of land reform. Through this, I will rebut the conventional argument that the land reform fragmented farmers into family units by establishing a system of independent farmers. I will also argue that farmers, using the existing social networks, actively responded to the process of land reform.
As for sources, I have looked at the basic sources of land reform such as "Toji daejang" (land registers), "Bunbae nongji daega sanghwan daejang" (repayment registers for distributed land), "Jijubyeol nongji hwakin illampyo" (list of land for each landlord), and the "Bunbae nongjibu" (list of distributed land). 5 In addition, I have also examined family genealogies and documents from organizations run by locals of the region. Through field research, I have also collected the biographical information of those listed in the documents, particularities of families, and relationships between families.
5. Land registers of Jangheung-gun, Yongsan-myeon from 1915 when the cadastral survey was carried out to 1975 when they started to be written on cards, record the size and category of land holdings and the name and address of the owner for each pilji. These are the best sources for tracing the changes in land ownership. The "Bunbae nongjiga sanghwan daejang" was created at the outset of the land reform. The "Jijubyeol nongji hwakin illampyo" was produced in 1951. The latter lists the lands taken and distributed for each landlord. It does contain some errors, and they were remedied by comparing it with the "Bunbae nongjibu" that will be discussed later. The "Bunbae nongjibu" was produced in 1960 due to the postponement of the land reform's completion. It records ex-landlords, recipients, land category and other data, and the amounts to be repaid for land.
Chilliansok and its Land Ownership Structure at the Time of Liberation
Chilliansok, the region analyzed in this article, is a common designation referring to the villages of Sanggeum-ri, Hageum-ri, and Gwanji-ri in Yongsanmyeon, Jangheung-gun in Jeollanam-do. The term "Chilliansok" 칠리안속 ("inner-seven-villages") derives from the fact that prior to the 1914 administrative reform that reorganized the villages in the area into three "new-villages," the seven "old-villages" of this region had formed a close-knit community.
6
Enclosed save for one opening on its western border, the villages of Chilliansok sit rather isolated within inverted C-shaped mountain ranges while sharing a single large plain. The Geumgok Stream runs through the middle of this region, with villages situated around the borders of the Geumgok plain with mountain ranges to their backs. In Jangheung-gun, Yongsan-myeon has long been considered as the region with the strongest yangban presence and power. In Yongsan-myeon, Sanggeum and Hageum are often counted as two of the three best-known yangban villages of the region. Chilliansok, therefore, formed an independent living sphere with a strong tradition of status-based hierarchy that functioned well into the twentieth century.
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The major yangban clans within the Chilliansok are the Suwon Baek, Yeonggwang Kim, and Incheon Yi. The head family of Suwon Baek is based in Sanggeum village, while the Suwon Baek's less prestigious branches settled the neighboring villages of Songjeon, Chodang, and Woljeong. Because of this, while Sanggeum village is a yangban village dominated by the Suwon Baek, the 6. In the 1914 administrative reform, the colonial state merged two or three old-villages into a single new-village. Realizing after years that the bond and livelihoods based on the old-village has not been dismantled by the administrative reform, the colonial state started calling the old-village units as "burak" and used them as basic units of mobilization from the 1930s (Yun Haedong, Jibae wa jachi-singminjigi chollak ui samgukmyeon gujo [Seoul: Yeoksa bipyeongsa, 2006], 202) . In order to avoid confusion, in this paper the old pre-1914 villages will be referred to as "village" and the new villages formed in 1914, and which continue as legal districts to this day, as "ri." other three villages have other family members living alongside the Baek and count as B category yangban villages. Hageum village is one of the three yangban villages of Yongsan-myeon, and here the Yeonggwang Kim and Incheon Yi maintain a similar status in terms of numbers and power. Gwanji village is mostly composed of the Jangyeon Byeon family. While the Jangyeon Byeon family produced a significant number of executive members of the local Confucian school back in the eighteenth century, its power and status declined considerably in the nineteenth century to the point that its members were no longer recognized as yangban. Jeongjang village was largely made up of members of the Gwangsan Kim family. The Gwangsan Kim family of Jeongjang were discriminated against in terms of status, and did not have much of a voice in the region. In sum, the Yeonggwang Kim and Incheon Yi of Hageum village and the Suwon Baek of Sanggeum village were at the apex of the local traditional power structure, while the Suwon Baek of Songjeon, Chodang, and Woljeong were also respected as yangban. Therefore, in this article, they will be categorized as the "leading families" of the region. Other families, such as the Jangyeon Byeon family of Gwanji village and the Gwangsan Kim family of Jeongjang village, will be categorized as "ordinary families." 8 8. In order to avoid overestimating the capacity of these "leading families," I did not count prestigious families as counting among the leading families if they did not live where the family At the time of liberation, Chilliansok was a typical paddy-land areaaround 85 percent of the total land in Chilliansok was cultivated, and of that around 75 percent was composed of rice paddies. Gwanji-ri and Sanggeum-ri each had about 150 jeongbo of land, while Hageum-ri had around 115 jeongbo. According to the testimonies of locals and various publications by the local government dating from the 1970s, the area of land of these villages and their population appear to be proportional. Who owned the lands in Chilliansok at the time of liberation?
To understand the structure of land ownership at the time of liberation (1945) in its proper historical context, it would be useful to compare it with data from the 1915 cadastral survey, carried out at a time before the actualization of the colonial landlord system (see Chart 1). In 1915, locals owned about 80 percent of the total cultivated land in Chilliansok, while a few landlords residing outside of the county owned around 10 percent of the paddies. By 1945, however, the size of land owned by the locals dropped to around half of the 1915 data, with the majority of ownership decreases taking place in rice paddies. The changes in land ownership structure, for the most part, had to do with the Japanese residents of Jangheung-gun's Jangheung-eup and Gwansanhad traditionally lived (for example, if a Yeonggwang Kim family was residing in Sanggeum-ri or Gwanji-ri rather than its traditional stronghold of Hageum-ri). While further classification of the leading families would be useful, I have not done so in this article due to the complexities of classification. eup, who increased their holdings throughout the colonial period. We can tell from such statistics that Chilliansok was deeply affected by the development of the colonial landlord system. Looking at the conditions of land ownership by the locals of Chilliansok at the time of liberation compared to 1915, one notes that while the number of landowners increased by around 50 percent, the size of their holdings dropped by almost 40 percent. While one must take into account the number of those who did not own land as well as land ownership that was not listed in land registers of the time, 9 the undeniably substantial decline in land ownership reveals the worsening economic conditions of the region over this period. Considering the fact that the average area of land owned by the residents decreased from around ten danbo in 1915 to a mere four danbo at the time of liberation, one can assume that the locals were living under dire economic conditions by 1945. 10 9. The land registers only contain information on the landowners. They often do not include timely information on transfers of ownership and changes in residence. Even with such limitations, however, land registers are our best source for tracing land ownership.
10. Generally speaking, 10 danbo of independent farmland or 20 danbo of tenanted farmland was necessary for financial independence at the time (Kim Seongbo, "1900-50-yeondae Jincheon-gun Iwon-myeon toji," 174). Source: "Toji daejang," Jangheung-gun, Yongsan-myeon Let's take this trend and compare it to those family categories delineated above. While both "ordinary" and "leading" families suffered considerably in terms of their land ownership, one can easily discern that ordinary families suffered far more relative to the leading families of the region. Through the 30-year period, the number of landowners increased by around 75 percent among leading families, while this statistic was only around 30 percent for ordinary families. Furthermore, while land loss among leading families was around 25 percent, ordinary families lost more than half of their land holdings. Such developments evidently changed the ratio of land ownership in the regionwhile ordinary families owned more than half of the land in Chilliansok in 1915, by the time of liberation land ownership by leading families outstripped that of ordinary families by a ratio of 6:4. In other words, ordinary families suffered far more from the development of the colonial landlord system compared to the leading families of the region. National liberation arrived under such circumstances.
Changes in Land Ownership Due to the Prior Selling of Land and
Land Distribution
Prior Selling of Land and Ordinary Selling of Land before the Land Reform
As is well-known, South Korean landlords in the post-liberation years began to sell off their lands at the prospect of land reform. By the end of 1945, around half of all tenanted land, and around 60 percent of tenanted land held by Korean landlords, was said to have been sold off. 11 While the prior selling of land was one of the factors that has been invoked to downplay the impact of the South Korean land reform, more recent research suggests that the prior selling of land should be considered, in a larger sense, as a part of the land reform. How did prior selling of land take place in the Chilliansok?
Out of the total cultivated land of 353 jeongbo in Chilliansok, around eighty jeongbo (23 percent) were distributed via the land reform. Sixty-nine jeongbo of Chilliansok land, around 20 percent, exchanged hands through transactions prior to the land reform.
12 However, it is difficult to distinguish 11. Kim Seongho et al., Nongji gaehyeoksa yeongu (Seoul: Hanguk nongchon gyeongje yeonguwon, 1989), 1029.
12. While changes of ownership as recorded in land registers include both transactions and inheritances, they are difficult to verify due to the sheer amount of data. In this article, therefore, I
ordinary land transactions from transactions taking place specifically in response to the land reform, as both cases did take place. For the sake of clarity, I want to use the following categories to define what prior selling of land is. First, lands sold by those whose lands were distributed during the land reform. Second, lands sold by those who owned more than three jeongbo of land within Chilliansok. Because this article only analyzes land within Chilliansok, however, there may be cases of families who had significant land holdings outside of this region. Therefore, the third category will also account for lands sold by those who owned more than two jeongbo of land in Chilliansok. Fourth, I will also account for those land sales by families who owned less than two jeongbo of land in Chilliansok, if those lands were owned by those residing outside of Yongsan-myeon-as such lands owned by absentee landlords would have been targeted by the land reform. According to the aforementioned categories, around fifty-four jeongbo (around 80 percent) of the total of sixty-nine jeongbo of transacted land in Chilliansok can be categorized as cases of prior selling of land motivated by the prospect of land reform.
13 Among this fifty-four jeongbo, only 3.8 jeongbo (around 7 percent) of land was sold by those who lived within Yongsan-myeon (a total of five individuals). Four out of these five lived in Chilliansok. Only one person owned more than three jeongbo of land, while the other three collectively owned around 1.5 jeongbo of land.
In sum, most of the prior selling of land in Chilliansok was carried out by Korean landlords living outside of Yongsan-myeon. The reason behind the predominance of absentee landlords in the prior selling of land most likely had to do with the fact that there were very few landlords living within Chilliansok. 14 This is an important particularity that allows us to deduce that there must have been very little, if any, personal relationships and hierarchies existing between landlords and tenants in Chilliansok at the time of the reform.
Once organized into types of transactions as well as family categories, several will view all recorded changes as transactions. While the transactions within the same clan must have included inheritances, I do not think this will hinder us from grasping the general trends.
13. In terms of the percentages of these compulsory land sales falling under the aforementioned four categories, the first and second categories comprised 65 percent of these land sales, the third type 10 percent, and the fourth the remaining 25 percent.
14. At the time of liberation, there was only one person in Chilliansok owning more than 3 jeongbo of land. Out of the approximately 4 jeongbo of land he owned, he sold around 1 jeongbo prior to the land reform, and only had 1 pilji 287 pyeong of land distributed in the land reform. According to the data, the other landlords of Chilliansok all owned less than 1,000 pyeong of land, and only about 300 pyeong of land were distributed. They do not appear to be landlordsthey most likely had abandoned farming or left the town.
notable trends can be detected from the data. As can be seen in Table 3 , leading families of Chilliansok purchased around 30 percent of the lands while ordinary families of the region purchased around 60 percent. Considering the fact that prior selling of land was not compulsory and did not favor the landlords due to the pressure of the impending land reform, 15 it is significant that ordinary families, whose economic conditions were not better relative to the leading families, actively acquired land by taking advantage of the landlords scrambling to sell their land before the reform. One of the reasons behind this, of course, has to do with the fact that those ordinary families were tenants of those absentee landlords who were trying to sell their land before the land reform.
15. The older understanding that the prior selling of land was coerced and that land was sold at inflated prices by the landlords has been thoroughly refuted by the more empirical research of the 1980s (see for instance, Jang Sanghwan, "Nongji gaehyeok gwajeong e gwanhan siljeungjeok yeongu [sang] ," Gyeongje sahak 8 [1984] : 195-272; Bak Seokdu, "Nongji gaehyeok gwa singmin jiji juje ui haeche-Gyeongju yissiga ui toji gyeongyeong sarye reul jungsim euro," Gyeongje sahak 11 [1987] : 187-281; Ryu Gicheon, "Nongji gaeyeok gwa toji soyu gwangye ui byeonhwa-e gwanhan yeongu -Chungnam Yeon'gi-gun Nammyeon ui sarye reul jungsim euro," Gyeongje sahak 14 [1990]: 147-198) . More recent research is also showing that the prices of land sold prior to the reform were often flexible and depended on specific conditions of the time due to the changing prospects of the land reform (Hong Seongchan, Hanguk geundae nongchon sahoe ui byeondong gwa jijucheung [Seoul: Jisik saneopsa, 1992] ; Ha Yusik, "Ulsan-gun Sangbuk-myeon ui nongji gaehyeok yeongu," Ph.D. diss., Busan National University, 2010). However, one should not discount the efforts by ordinary families to take advantage of the dynamism and uncertainty of the liberation period to improve their lives. An additional factor is the fact that it was the absentee landlords who were selling their lands, uninfluenced by internal power dynamics within Chilliansok. On the contrary, leading families appear to dominate the land transactions that occurred among the locals of Chilliansok. As can be seen in Table 4 , around 50 percent of land in the "ordinary transactions" of land went to the leading families, while only 40 percent went to the ordinary families of Chilliansok. Things become even more interesting when one categorizes the "ordinary transactions" into specific family lineages. Looking at the overall shape of "ordinary transactions," one notices that ordinary families sold a lot more land than did leading families, and that leading families purchased a bit more land than did ordinary families. Due to the lands purchased by ordinary families from absentee landlords, the sizes of overall purchases for both categories are around the same. However, ordinary families did sell more of their land than leading families. 16 In sum, leading 16. Because Table 4 accounts for multiple transactions of the same land, the difference between the leading families and the ordinary families in the total area of land purchased is only 1 percent in favor of the leading families. However, because Table 3 lists only the final transactions, the difference is 7 percent in favor of the leading families. Table 4 shows that while the land disposals of ordinary families were much higher vis-à-vis the leading families, the size of their overall land purchases was about the same. This, of course, shows the relative lack of stability in land families purchased more land compared to ordinary families in the land transactions among the locals of Chilliansok. Of particular note, in cases where a leading family sold its land, usually it was purchased by another leading family. More than half of such cases took place between members of the same family lineage. For the land put up for sale by ordinary families, however, the purchaser was more often a leading family. Among ordinary families, land transactions between those of the same family lineage accounted for only 15 percent. In sum, for "ordinary transactions," leading families tended to buy up the lands of ordinary families. Furthermore, family lineage played a minor role in transactions between ordinary families while it played a major role among leading families. 17 While the number of land transactions among Chilliansok residents before the land reform was not high, such trends, based on the system of traditional authority, continued to reappear in later periods.
Size and Success of Land Distribution at the Time of the Land Reform
The South Korean land reform commenced with the distribution of land a few months prior to the outbreak of the Korean War. In the case of Jangheung-gun, around 3,530 jeongbo of land, or around 25 percent of the total 13,662 jeongbo of its cultivated land, was distributed. Of the distributed land, around 70 percent had been formerly owned by Japanese. 18 In Chilliansok, around 23 percent of the total cultivated land (26 percent of rice paddies and 13 percent of fields) was distributed in the land reform. The total size of distributed land in Chilliansok, at around eighty jeongbo, was about 150 percent of the fifty-four jeongbo of land that was sold prior to the land reform. Around 90 percent of the distributed land in Chilliansok had been previously owned by Japanese landlords residing in the county. On the other hand, lands owned by those living in Yongsan-myeon totalled less than three jeongbo (less than 5 percent of the distributed land). While the land reform had a relatively significant impact on Chilliansok in terms of both number of recipients and area of land, 19 the lack ownership among the ordinary families.
17. While the leading families here were confirmed to be of the same clan, the same cannot be said for the ordinary families, as they were not entirely confirmed due to the nature of the data. In other words, some of the data for ordinary families may include those with identical last names but from different clans.
18. Jangheung-gun tonggye yeonbo (1963 edition).
19. Among the fourteen ri-level divisions of Yongsan-myeon, Sanggeum-ri had the highest number of recipients of distributed land, while Gwanji-ri had the largest area of distributed land. While slightly lower than Sanggeum-ri and Gwanji-ri, Hageum-ri also had substantial numbers of of landlord presence within Chilliansok most likely ruled out landlord-tenant relationships at a personal level having any impact in the region. Source: "Jangheung-gun Yongsan-myeon bunbae nongji daega sanghwan daejang"
Looking at the conditions of distributed land reception according to categories of families, as in the case of the prior selling of land, one notes a relative dominance of ordinary families. Ordinary families made up around 55 percent of all recipients of distributed land, and they also received around 60 percent of all distributed land in Chilliansok. Ordinary families also led leading families in the average area of received land per person. Furthermore, among the eight individuals who received more than one jeongbo of land, the first seven were categorized as coming from ordinary families. In sum, the distribution of land in Chilliansok favored the ordinary families of the region. As was the case with the prior selling of land, such evidence shows that the land reform indeed benefitted and provided hope to those in the rural communities who had been marginalized and turned into tenants.
In order to better understand the earlier achievements of land reform through the prior selling of land and land distribution, assuming that the rights of ownership had been granted to the recipients at the time of the land distribution, let us take a look at the conditions of land ownership in 1950 immediately after the land distribution.
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It is a well-known fact that the landlord system in Korea met its demise through the massive prior selling of land motivated by the prospect of imminent recipients as well as distributed land.
20. Distributed lands were not updated on the land registers until they were fully paid for and titles had been transferred. The rights to the distributed lands, however, went to the recipients at the time of the distribution. That is why assuming ownership at the time of distribution in analyzing the condition of land holdings helps us to understand the accomplishments as well as the possibilities of land reform. The question of whether or not the recipients become the actual owners of the distributed lands is another issue and will be discussed in later sections. land reform as well as by the actual distribution of land through land reform. Chart 2 shows that most of the land in Chilliansok that was owned by outsiders under the colonial landlord system was returned to the locals through land reform. If we compare the conditions of land ownership at the time of liberation, one gains a better picture of the land reform's achievements.
According to Table 6 , the number of landowners in Chilliansok increased by 50 percent over the five-year period following liberation. The area of land they owned increased by 65 percent over the same period. The average size of land owned per person also increased by 10 percent to around 4.4 danbo. While it is questionable that a system of independent farmers replaced the previous system The achievements of the prior selling of land and land distribution can be better comprehended by categorizing the data according to families. Ordinary families, despite the relative economic decline they suffered during the colonial period, substantially increased their holdings through the land reform. Not only did the absolute number of landowners increase among ordinary families, but such families also doubled the overall size of their lands they owned over the five-year period. By contrast, the rate of increase in land ownership among the leading families over the same period was around 45 percent, less than half that of their counterparts. As a result, by 1950 the 6-to-4 dominance in landownership by leading families in Chilliansok at the time of liberation had changed to a roughly toe-to-toe distribution of land ownership among leading and ordinary families. Indeed, ordinary families of Chilliansok made substantial gains through the land reform despite their place within the traditional power structure.
As can be seen, the developments surrounding land reform had the potential to shake up the traditional power relationships in Chilliansok. There were, however, additional hurdles to overcome. To begin with, the size of distributed land plots was too small-around half of all recipients received less than 3 danbo of land. In the next section, I will examine the sustainability of the new independent farmer system by examining changes in land ownership following the land reform.
Developments in the Land Ownership Structure following the Land Reform
Ownership Changes in Distributed Lands
The first hurdle to be overcome in order for the land reform to be successful was repayment to the state by the recipients of land, which for many was quite a burdensome prospect. According to the regulations on land reform, recipient households had to pay back 30 percent of their overall harvest from the distributed land for five years in order to receive the titles for the distributed land and become its legal owners. However, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 soon upset these plans. A temporary income tax on land, instituted by the South Korean government to help fund the war, further burdened farmers. In the end, the South Korean government had no choice but to further postpone the payment schedules for the former landlords while continuing to urge repayment by the recipients of the land. Meanwhile, an increasing number of farmers began to abandon their distributed lands due to these economic burdens. In such cases, the distributed lands were transferred to others with better economic means. While such transfers were against the regulations set forth by the land reform, they nevertheless occurred in the wartime context on a massive scale. In May 1961, the South Korean government enacted the Special Act on the Transfer of Distributed Land to formally recognize these exchanges of land as well as the transfers of their titles.
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The selling of distributed land in Chilliansok can be examined by comparing the list of distributed land compiled at the time of the land reform in 1950 with the land registers that include the transfers of title that occurred afterwards. Table 7 organizes these two sets of data and compares them. Because some of the land plots (pilji) had been divided and transferred to different owners, they were accounted for by the land registers.
In Chilliansok, the cases of "Failures" did not number much-twelve pilji 21. Bak Seokdu, 1993 , "Daehan minguk ui surip gwa nongji gaehyeok," in Jaengjeom Hanguk geunhyeondaesa, vol. 3, 67-77. Note: "Successes" refers to cases in which the original recipient received the title for the land distributed. "Changes" refer to transfers of land. "Failures" refers to cases in which the distributed land went back to the original landlord that had owned the land prior to the land reform. "Inheritance" refers to the father-to-son transfer of land. "Re-selling" refers to the cases accounted for in "Changes" that were not father-to-son transfers.
(around 3 percent). Such data, of course, reaffirms the fact that the dismantlement of the landlord system was irreversible. It is noticeable, however, that the cases of "Failures" tended to be concentrated among ordinary families. Only around 60 percent of cases saw the original recipients of land obtaining titles to their holdings under their own names ("Successes"). The remaining 40 percent had the titles transferred to someone else. Among the cases of "Changes," around 25 percent involved father-to-son title transfer, which can be considered as de facto "Successes." 22 With the inheritance factor counted in, the rate of success becomes around 69 percent for leading families and around 72 percent for ordinary families. There is not much of a difference between the two categories. What can be discerned is that ordinary families had slightly higher rates of both success and failure compared to leading families in Chilliansok. Next, the re-selling of distributed land (excluding cases of inheritances) made up about 25 percent of the "Changes," and that rate was slightly higher for leading families. Now, let us analyze cases in which the original recipient of the distributed land did not become the title owner of that land: i.e., "Failures" and "Reselling." These two categories comprise around 30 percent of the cases listed 22. Among the 143 pilji of distributed land that changed hands, 92 pilji changed hands among those of the same surname. Among these, 40 pilji were confirmed to been inherited, 43 pilji not inherited, while 9 pilji are still in question. Of the nine pilji in question, four belonged to leading families and five to ordinary families. As the sizes are about the same for both (3,500 pyeong), they are not useful for comparing and contrasting the two categories of families. Excluding inheritance, the rate for re-sale of distributed land was 26.3 percent, which is not much different from the provincial average of 29.7 percent. Nationally, Chungcheongnam-do had the lowest rate of the re-sale of distributed land, with 12.1 percent, while Jeollabuk-do had the nation's highest rate at 50.1 percent. Jeollanam-do's 29.7 percent was close to the national average (Hanguk nongchon gyeongje yeonguwon, Nongji gaehyeoksa gwangye saryojip 3 [Han'guk nongchon gyeongje yeonguwon, 1984], 92-93). here. Let's examine the accomplishments of land distribution that favored ordinary families by examining this 30 percent according to the family categories. In Table 8 , 75 percent of re-sales of land by leading families targeted other leading families. By contrast, less than two-thirds of the re-sales of land by ordinary families targeted other ordinary families. In addition, a greater proportion of ordinary families saw their distributed lands revert to its original landlords. Because of these factors, the final result of changes in land ownership favored the leading families of Chilliansok. In sum, leading families saw their land possessions increase a bit through the process of title transfer by giving up 34,287 pyeong of distributed land while gaining 35,616 pyeong. On the other hand, ordinary families lost about 10,000 pyeong of land through the same process by giving up 42,765 pyeong of distributed land while gaining 32,180 pyeong. What is perhaps more striking between the family categories is the rate of transactions between members of the same family lineage. While 64 percent of the land given up by leading families went to members of the same family lineage, the rate was 33 percent for ordinary families.
In sum, the changes in land ownership of distributed land, like ordinary transactions that took place before the land reform, tended to move from ordinary families to leading families. While blood ties played an important role for transactions among leading families, they played a much less important role for transactions among ordinary families. The factor of blood ties is something that also played a role in ordinary land transactions before the land reform. While the land reform itself favored and benefitted those who were marginalized in the local power structure, the leading families of the region nevertheless took advantage of existing power structures and networks in the process of obtaining titles for the distributed land.
Transactions of Land Outside of the Land Reform
To gain a deeper and more thorough understanding of the land reform, it is important to look at what happened to the land after the titles had been transferred. However, the distributed land made up less than 25 percent of the total farmland, and it is highly likely that those who received distributed land owned additional land elsewhere. Therefore, in order to examine how much improvement the land reform brought, we must take lands that were not targeted for distribution into consideration as well. Setting the temporal bounds from the beginning of land reform between 1950 and 1969, 23 I will account for 23 . The land reform formally ended in March 1969 through the Special Act on the Completion of the transactions that took place after the title transfer for the distributed lands and all transactions for lands that were not distributed through the land reform. Looking at the transaction data, the aforementioned trend favoring the leading families reappears. Overall, ordinary families sold more land and bought less land relative to leading families. Furthermore, while over 80 percent of the land put up for sale by the leading families was purchased by other leading families, less than 70 percent of the land put for sale by ordinary families was purchased by other such families. Around 75 percent of all transactions between leading families were carried out amongst the members of same family lineage, while this was the case for less than one-third of transactions by ordinary families. The general pattern in land transactions from 1950 to 1969 shows that leading families purchased more land than did ordinary families and blood ties meant more for leading families in making transactions.
In the end, in contrast to the relative advancement of ordinary families compared to leading families in the prior selling of land and the initial distribution of land in the land reform, the leading families dominated land transactions outside of the land reform during the 1950s and 1960s. Ordinary families excelled in the purchase of absentee landlords' land and receiving distribution land-cases that did not involve the preexisting power structure of local society. On the other hand, leading families had the upper hand in the transactions that must have been involved due to the preexisting structure of power and relationships in Chilliansok-ordinary transactions in the era immediately after liberation, title transfers of distributed land, and land transactions outside of the land reform. The fact that the majority of land transactions between leading families took place between members of the same family lineage shows that the network of kinship remained powerful into the 1960s.
3.The Structure of Land Ownership after Completion of the Land Reform
As seen thus far, the context of dynamic social change in the immediate postliberation period allowed those who were marginalized within the traditional power structure to take advantage of the prior selling of land as well as the land distribution to advance their interests and improve their economic status. Such advances by ordinary families of Chilliansok, however, were overturned in the redemption of distributed land and land transactions outside of the land reform. Such trends become clear when one compares the data from 1950 (presuming that the recipients secured ownership of the distributed land at that time) and data from the end of land reform in 1969 (see Table 10 ). While ordinary families had been able to catch up with the leading families in terms of the size of total land holdings by taking advantage of the prior selling of land and distributed land, they lagged behind leading families for the following twenty years. In terms of the number of landowners, the net increase among leading families between 1950 and 1969 was double that of ordinary families. While over that twenty-year period the leading families increased the overall area of Of course, the South Korean land reform destroyed the landlord system and buoyed the hopes of poor farmers who had been marginalized within the local society's power structure. However, the retrogression demonstrated above that followed the land reform may have been destined from the start. While the land reform, in its larger significance, including the prior sales of land motivated by the prospect of land reform, significantly improved the economic status of the ordinary families of Chilliansok, their newly gained independence was not necessarily sustainable over time. Most importantly, the size of the land plots of these ordinary family farmers was insufficient for providing sustainable independence in the long term. This issue, of course, was not limited to the ordinary families. The average size of individual plots of cultivated land in Chilliansok as a whole was less than five danbo. The ordinary families, however, had it a lot harder than their leading families counterparts.
As can be seen, the ordinary families of Chilliansok were in a worse economic condition compared to the leading families, even with the distribution of land in 1950. As can be seen in Table 11 , more than 70 percent of the ordinary families of Chilliansok owned less than 0.5 jeongbo (5 danbo) of land-8 percent higher than was the case among leading families. Furthermore, the ordinary families owned fewer plots of land than the leading families in most categories. By the end of the land reform in 1969, a downward standardization had taken place for both categories of families. Looking at the landowners in Chilliansok as a whole, those who owned less than 5 danbo of land increased by 4 percent, while the numbers in all other categories also dropped across the board. This, of course, reflects the population increase of the region that decreased the size of land holdings per household. The impact, however, particularly affected the ordinary families of Chilliansok. By 1969, only about 7 percent of the ordinary families owned more than 1 jeongbo of land-typically considered the minimum area of land needed to achieve selfsufficiency. The percentage of those owning less than five danbo of land was also 10 percent higher among the ordinary families. Such statistics are particularly significant considering the lower rate of increase in landowners among the ordinary families. Perhaps the ordinary families could not fall any further.
In the end, while the land reform transformed tenants into farmers with their own lands, the fact that most of them remained impoverished petty farmers shows that the land reform failed to create a system of truly independent farmers. Only radical improvements in agricultural productivity or institutional support for small farmers could have ameliorated the inherent instability of the system. South Korean society of the 1950s and 1960s, however, could do neither. 24 Therefore, small farmers faced a struggle for their survival even after the land reform.
Networks based on blood ties must have become important at this point. Unfortunately, however, there is no available data that can show how different networks based on blood ties functioned in Chilliansok pre-and post-land reform. We can, however, make rough estimates based on the surrounding circumstances, logical deductions, and local memories.
We can make a common sense assumption that the traditional yangban families most likely had strong economic bases as well as stronger kinship networks than other families. Many leading families of Chilliansok have maintained various traditional kinship-based organizations to this day. 25 The activities of such organizations can be seen in the sizes of lands that have been excluded from the land reform to be used for the purpose of ancestral rites. According to Table 12 , the ratio of such lands held by leading families versus ordinary families is 8:2. While the size of such land does not automatically speak for the strength of kinship networks, we can still assume a significant interrelation. Among the ordinary families, the Jangyeon Byeon family is exceptional in its considerable land holdings designated for use in ancestral rites. Other than the Jangyeon Byeon family, such lands were held on a small scale by Kim families of different origins. Considering the higher success rate in retaining distributed land by the members of Jangyeon Byeon family (10 percent higher than the average), one can surmise that blood ties played a significant role in protecting family members from the limitations of small-scale independent farming. According to local testimonies, the Yeonggwang Kim family of Hageum village traditionally possessed substantial amounts of clan-owned lands, and many Yeonggwang Kim family members of Hageum relied on those lands for their livelihoods. The family often allowed poor but reliable family members to work the clan-owned lands as tenants. The rents on those lands were often set at half of the market rate-providing a significant financial benefit to the family members.
26 Perhaps because of this, the Yeonggwang Kim family of Hageum village actually saw the size of their collective land holdings increase during the 26. As for the operation of the clan lands of the Yeonggwang Kim family of Hageum village, I received help from Mr. Samsik Kim (b. 1933) of Hageum village. According to the Yeonggwang Kim family's "Clan-association Book" (Mungyean 門契案, 1958-present), which I was able to view through the facilitation of Mr. Samsik Kim, all the tillers of those lands were from the same Kim family. Source: "Jangheung-gun Yongsan-myeon toji daejang" (1951) colonial period-a notable exception among the families of Chilliansok. Yeonggwang Kim family members in Hageum village also received relatively lesser amounts of distributed land from the land reform, and they also successfully received titles for all the lands they received. The case of the Yeonggwang Kim family of Hageum shows that the kinship networks must have played a positive role in overcoming the limitations of the land reform by providing additional financial stability.
Conclusion
In the case of Chilliansok, those who had been traditionally marginalized in the local society sought to create a new and better life by taking advantage of the opportunities of prior land selling and land distribution offered by the land reform. Yet the institutional limitations of the land reform meant true economic independence still could not be achieved. The land reform could not change the nature of small-scale farming, and the state did not provide any institutional assistance to those farmers who could not be self-sufficient with what they had. The farmers, however, did not band together, and they also could not expect compassion from the landlords. What they had was social resources, such as kinship networks, that had been operating in rural communities for generations. Such networks, however, existed unevenly through the system of traditional authority and influenced the process of land reform from the start. In receiving distributed land and buying lands put up for sale at the prospect of land reform, those who had been marginalized in the power structure of local societies were able to gain substantial ground. However, in transactions of land outside of the land reform and in the transfer of distributed land, the types of transactions that were carried out between the locals, the leading families clearly dominated the ordinary families in advancing their economic interests. And in the processes of such transactions, the leading families more often took advantage of the existing kinship networks. Such patterns show that even the kinship networks worked unevenly between the households of Chilliansokclearly putting the ordinary families in economically disadvantaged positions.
Armed with the power of traditional authority and well-organized kinship networks, the leading families were better equipped to deal with the rapid changes in the structure of land ownership in the post-liberation period. Without such support networks, the ordinary families had a more difficult time in reaping the benefits of the land reform. Unable to sustain their livelihoods, the last resort for many marginalized rural households was to move out of the countryside. The state-led rapid industrialization of the 1960s and 1970s allowed many of the rural poor to move to the cities for jobs. 27 Those who survived in the countryside also had no choice but to rely even further on the kinship networks, which led to the "re-traditionalization" of South Korean rural communities in the 1950s.
28
Despite the supposed "privatization" of the rural question through the land reform, farmers ended up relying on each other through their kinship networks instead of being controlled by the state as individuals. Before it could take root and create a broader vision for the rural communities, by the 1970s the said order based on kinship networks faced a new challenge-the state-led rural mobilization program known as the "New Village Movement." 27. Considering the apparent lack of policy intention or institutional support for overcoming the inherent limitations of unsustainable small-scale farming, I believe that the land reform lacked any type of long-term vision other than that of creating a massive industrial reserve army. Instead of contributing to the foundation for the development of capitalism in South Korea by creating a system of independent farmers, the land reform made its contribution by separating farmers from their lands (primitive accumulation). We can also easily assume that the socially weak and alienated suffered the most through the cruel process of separating farmers from their lands. As can be seen in Table 10 , the ordinary families of Chilliansok lost some of their land holdings and saw the rate of increase for the number of landowners go down in the period between 1950 and 1969. Such facts suggest that the ordinary families most likely spearheaded the massive rural exodus that began in the 1960s.
28. "Re-traditionalization" of rural communities refers, in more general terms, to the conservatization of rural communities through the Korean War and land reform. Symbolized by the phenomena of "clan voting" and the overwhelming support for the ruling party in the 1950s, this thesis conceptualizes how rural communities lost the dynamism of the immediate postliberation years and conservatized in the 1950s. However, Gang Incheol revisits the 1950s by focusing on "the formation of non-economical conditions for the economic modernization." He criticizes the focus on politics in gauging the conservatization thesis and argues that the conservatization of rural communities occurs as an active cultural response to American-style modernization (Gang Incheol, "Hanguk jeonjaeng gwa sahoe uisik mit munhwa ui byeonhwa," in Hanguk jeonjaeng gwa sahoe gujo ui byeonhwa, edited by Hanguk jeongsin munhwa yeonguwon [Seoul: Baeksan seodang, 1999], 197-301) . I believe the "re-traditionalization" of rural communities to be one of the fundamental concepts for understanding rural South Korea in the 1950s. I hope to expound further on this in future.
